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In 1990, Australia and New Zealand were ranked around 25
th and 35
th in terms of GNP 
per capita, having been the highest-income countries in the world one hundred years earlier. The 
poor performance over that long period contrasts markedly with that of the past 15 years, when 
these two economies out-performed most other high-income countries. This difference in growth 
performance is due to major economic policy reforms during the past two to three decades. We 
provide new evidence on the extent of governmental distortions to agricultural incentives in 
particular in the two economies since the late 1940s, both directly and indirectly (and negatively) 
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Following its ‘Gold Rush’ in the 1850s, Australia surpassed Britain in having the highest 
per capita income in the world, and New Zealand was not far behind. Both suffered from 
depressions in the 1890s before recovering their equal-first ranking just prior to the 
World War I, but for the following seven decades their incomes kept falling behind those 
of the United States and some other developed economies. They recovered briefly in the 
middle of the twentieth century thanks in part to the Korean war-induced boom in wool 
prices, when they were ranked equal second after the United States. But since then their 
rankings have continued to slide as the economies of Western Europe, Canada and Japan 
grew faster – and Australia and especially New Zealand grew slower – than the United 




respectively, according to the World Bank Atlas method of measuring GNP per capita 
(World Bank 2006). By that standard at least, the long-term economic performance of 
both the Australian and New Zealand (ANZ) over the one hundred years to the 1970s has 
to be described as relatively poor. 
During the past two decades, by contrast, these two small economies (with just 20 
and 4 million people, respectively) out-performed most other high-income countries, with 
their per capita incomes growing half as fast again as the OECD average. 
This marked difference between these countries’ recent and earlier relative 
performances is due to major economic policy reforms during the past two to three 
decades and in particular the belated opening of the ANZ economies first to each other 
and then to the rest of the world. Having been more protectionist than all other OECD 
countries for most of the twentieth century (Anderson and Garnaut 1987), and having 




to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the first seven rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations (1947 to 1979), Australia and New Zealand have 
undergone a remarkable degree of opening up of their current and capital accounts from 
the 1980s. This has reversed the downward trend in their trade share of GDP, although no 
more so than for other OECD countries (including the United States, whose share has 
trebled in the past three decades); and it has accelerated the downward trend in their 
average import tariff (Figure 2). The fact that this was accompanied by many domestic 
micro- and macro-economic reforms, and coincided with a long period of rapid global 
economic growth that was stimulated by the information and communication technology 
revolution and by the opening up of nearby resource-poor countries in East Asia, added 
to the scope for boosting gains from freeing their international trade and investment and 
floating their currencies.  
Another difference between the ANZ economies and most other OECD countries 
is that they are relatively well endowed with agricultural land per worker. This provides 
them with a strong comparative advantage in agricultural products. This is especially 
strong for New Zealand which, unlike Australia, is not also blessed with an abundance of 
mineral and energy resources. Trade protectionism in these economies thus meant 
restrictions on imports of manufactures, making their trade policy regime more like those 
of developing countries. True, in some decades they also had periods of agricultural 
subsidies, but overall the trade policy regime in both countries has involved an anti-
agricultural bias. The fact that those agricultural subsidies have been virtually eliminated 
over the past two decades also makes Australia and New Zealand an interesting political 
economy study, given the extreme difficulties other OECD countries have had in 
reforming their farm support programs (see Gardner 2007, Josling 2007, and Hayami and 
Honma 2007). 
  This chapter examines the extent to which that anti-agricultural bias has changed 
in these two countries since World War II, and the forces behind the policy evolution in 
each case. It begins by summarizing the structural changes that have accompanied their 
economic growth since the 1950s. It then describes the emergence/build-up of first 
manufacturing protection and then some agricultural subsidies, and then after the 1970s 




series of nominal rates of protection for both agriculture and manufacturing, stretching 
back to the mid-1940s for Australia and to the mid-1950s for New Zealand.  The reasons 
for these policy choices are then explored, dealing with first the gradual growth in market 
interventions to the 1970s and then their relatively rapid dismantling. The chapter 
concludes by discussing prospects for further policy reform and lessons for both other 
high-income countries and resource-rich developing economies. 
 
 
Growth and structural changes since 1950  
 
 
The comparatively poor growth performance of the ANZ economies for most of the 
twentieth century contrasts with that since the late 1980s, when they out-performed many 
other advanced economies in terms of GDP per capita growth (World Bank 2006). This 
was a period of especially rapid total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Australia 
(Parham et al. 1999, Dowrick 2001), in contrast to Britain where much of its catch-up has 
been due to growth in employment and hours worked per worker (Card and Freeman 
2002). A survey by Parham (2004) reports that Australia’s annual TFP growth rate 
accelerated a full percentage point during the 1990s. Since that was not the experience of 
other OECD countries, he asserts that domestic factors must provide a major part of the 
explanation, an important one being the greater openness of the economy to trade and 
investment.  
A more recent econometric study by Diewert and Lawrence (2006) demonstrates 
that productivity growth has been the dominant contributor to the growth in real welfare 
in Australia since 1960, with the terms of trade playing only a very minor role. Certainly 
prices in international markets for primary products relative to manufactures have been 
on a downward trend over the past century, but the decline has averaged less than 0.5 
percent per year (Appendix Figure 1).  
The difference between these economies’ recent and earlier relative performances 
is due very substantially to their economic policy reforms of the past three decades. The 




their per capita income ranking, but also is having a remarkable influence on their 
patterns of production and trade.  
For these natural resource-rich, relatively lightly populated economies,
1 the most 
appropriate theory of comparative advantage is a blend of two core models developed in 
the 20
th century: the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model which assumes all factors of 
production are mobile between sectors, and the Ricardo-Viner model which assumes 
some factors are sector-specific. Such a blend is provided by Krueger (1977) and 
explored further by Deardorff (1984). They consider two tradable sectors each using 
intersectorally mobile labour plus one sector-specific factor (natural-resource capital or 
industrial capital). Assuming that labour exhibits diminishing marginal product in each 
sector, and that there are no services or nontradables and no policy distortions, then at a 
given set of international prices the real wage is determined by the aggregate per worker 
endowment of natural-resource and industrial capital. The commodity composition of a 
country's trade – that is, the extent to which a country is a net exporter of primary or 
industrial products – is determined by its endowment of natural relative to industrial 
capital compared with that ratio for the rest of the world.  
Leamer (1987) develops this model further and relates it to paths of economic 
development. If the stock of natural resources is unchanged, rapid growth by one or more 
economies relative to others in their availability of industrial capital per worker would 
cause those economies to strengthen their comparative advantage in non-primary 
products. On the other hand, a discovery of minerals or energy raw materials would 
strengthen that country’s comparative advantage in mining and weaken its comparative 
advantage in farm and other goods, ceteris paribus. It would also boost national income 
and hence the demand for nontradables, which would cause mobile resources to move 
into the production of nontradables, further reducing farm and industrial production 
(Corden 1984).   
Domestic or foreign savings can be invested to enhance the stock and/or improve 
the quality not only of industrial capital but also of labour or natural resources, and to 
                                                 
1 New Zealand has around five times the global average of both agricultural land per capita and arable land 
per worker, and Australia has around twenty five times as much (Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson 2006). 
Of course the quality of farm land and associated water, rainfall, sunshine, etc. also matter, but even 




provide capital to the nontradables sector. Any such increase in the net stock of produced 
capital per worker will put upward pressure on real wages. That will encourage, in all 
sectors, the use of more labour-saving techniques and the development and/or 
importation of new technologies that are less labour intensive. 
Which types of capital would expand fastest in a free-market setting depends on 
their expected rates of return. The more densely populated, natural resource-poor a 
country, the greater the likelihood that the highest payoff would be in expanding its 
capital stocks for non-primary sectors. At early stages of development of such a country 
with a relatively small stock of natural resources per worker, wages would be low and the 
country would have a comparative cost advantage in unskilled labour-intensive, standard-
technology manufactures. Then as the stock of industrial capital grows, there would be a 
gradual move toward exporting more capital- and skill-intensive manufactures. Natural 
resource-abundant economies such as Australia and New Zealand, however, would 
develop a comparative advantage in manufacturing at a late stage of development, and 
their industrial exports would be relatively capital intensive. And with New Zealand’s 
lesser mineral and energy resources per worker and poorer climatic conditions for 
broadacre cropping than Australia, its agricultural comparative advantages would be 
stronger in aggregate but less focused on cereal and oilseed cropping than Australia’s. 
The above theory of changing comparative advantages has been used successfully 
to explain the evolving pattern of exports of Australia and its Asian trading partners 
(Anderson and Garnaut 1980, 1987; Anderson and Smith 1981; Anderson 1995), and is 
also consistent with New Zealand’s trade pattern. It can be used also to explain shocks to 
that evolutionary pattern, as with mining booms. And it is consistent with the larger 
shares of farm revenue (at unassisted prices) from livestock and horticultural crops 
compared with grains, oilseeds, sugar and cotton for New Zealand relative to Australia, 
as reported in Appendix Figure 2.  
But the evolving pattern of a country’s production and trade specialization also 
depends on policy choices and their changes over time. In the ANZ cases, their long 
history of industrial protectionism (reflected in the relatively high implicit tariffs) 





2 It also ensured a bigger manufacturing sector than would have emerged 
under free trade, which was possible in their full-employment setting only at the expense 
of other sectors. The sectoral shares of GDP by the early 1960s were close to the OECD 
average of around 30 per cent, even though Australia and New Zealand have always been 
lightly populated and so have a weak comparative advantage in manufactures. 
The removal of the ban on key mineral raw material exports in the early 1960s 
and the tariff reforms of the 1970s and 1980s corrected that distortion for Australia. 
Between 1960 and 2005, manufacturing’s share of GDP fell much more rapidly for 
Australia than for the average OECD country, to just 11 per cent, while the mining 
sectors share initially trebled (Table 1a).  
Mining’s share of Australian exports more than trebled between the early 1960s 
and early 1980s (Table 1a), helped of course by the dramatic rises in energy raw material 
prices in second of those decades.
3 And even though that lowered agriculture’s relative 
contribution, the share of exports in the gross value of farm production increased 
considerably, from around 55 to 75 percent since the mid-1970s (Figure 3). Moreover, 
that growth in farm exports came from an increasing range of farm products, as farmers 
diversified away from the traditional wheat and sheep enterprises to beef, cotton, sugar, 
dairy products, wine, and rapeseed (Appendix Figures 3 and 4).  
It was not only natural resource-based exportables that Australia’s protectionism 
had discouraged, however. Also discouraged were export industries within the 
manufacturing sector, as well as services exports. Together those two sectors contributed 
only one-twelth of Australia’s exports in the early 1950s. Even by 1980 their contribution 
was barely above one-quarter, but by 1990 it had risen to one-third and by 2005 to 44 per 
cent or 22 per cent each, thus each surpassing the 21 per cent share for agriculture for the 
first time (Table 1a).  
                                                 
2 In terms of population, Australia is somewhat smaller than Argentina and Canada but similar in terms of 
arable land, and New Zealand is similar in population, arable land and other agricultural attributes to the 
average of the Nordic countries. But the antipodean location of Australia and New Zealand compared with 
those other countries leads one to expect them to have traded less (and be specialized in more storable and 
less bulky exports) than these comparator countries, at least prior to East Asia’s trade-led growth takeoff. 
3 Mining was also an important export earner for Australia in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but 
due almost entirely to gold. Gold’s share of total exports was 49 percent in 1861, and while it fell to about 
one-sixth in the 1980s it returned to 28 percent in 1900. During the 1961-90 period, wool plus gold 




The transformation in New Zealand was in some ways similar, except it did not 
have the mineral resources to enjoy a mining boom. Furthermore, it was affected 
relatively much more than Australia by the coming into force from 1983 of the Australia 
New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA): its lower 
wages allowed it to rapidly expand exports of manufactures and services to the much 
bigger Australian economy under that preferential arrangement. Together with the virtual 
elimination of its manufacturing protection these forces brought to a halt the decline in 
agriculture’s share of New Zealand’s GDP, in fact raising it from its low of 7 per cent in 
the latter 1980s to 9 percent in the early 2000s – notwithstanding the abolition of non-
trivial agricultural subsidies in the 1980s. Over that same period the share of food and 
agricultural products in New Zealand’s exports have fallen somewhat to the benefit of 






This section begins with a brief history of policies up to the early 1970s, then the changes 
in the next dozen years before the reforms accelerated in the mid-1980s. Since there were 
relatively few agricultural subsidies or farm import barriers (other than quarantine 
restrictions) through most of the past century, the story in both countries is more about 
the indirect anti-agricultural bias that resulted from protection of manufacturing. 
Nonetheless, we also include coverage of policies that directly distorted various 
agricultural markets post-World War II.  
We know that it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government 
assistance that affect incentives. In a two-sector model an import tax has the same effect 
on the export sector as an export tax (the Lerner Symmetry Theorem), and this carries 
over to a model that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables (Vousden 
1990, pp. 46-47). For that reason we report the average nominal rate of assistance (NRA) 
for the tradable parts of the agricultural sector, based on NRA estimates for individual 




sectors. The NRA is the equivalent of the percentage by which government policies have 
raised the producer price above what it would be without the government’s intervention.
4 




t/100) – 1] 
where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables parts 
of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. Since the NRA must be 
greater than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, so too must the RRA. The 
usefulness of this measure is that if it is below zero, it indicates the extent to which the 
policy regime has an anti-agricultural bias, and conversely when RRA is positive. 
 
Prior to the early 1970s  
 
The long history of ANZ industrial protectionism has its roots in the formation in 1901 of 
the Australian Federation – which New Zealand decided not to join but instead became 
separately independent of Britain. Tariff revenue then accounted for almost one-fifth of 
government revenue in both countries. That is very high for what at the time were the 
world’s highest-income economies, since that share typically falls as per capita income 
rises. It is twice that of the Nordic countries, for example, even though their per capita 
incomes were barely half ANZ ones (Figures 1 and 2a). Tariffs on manufactures rose 
steadily in the decades that followed. They were supplemented by quantitative import 
restrictions first imposed in 1939, and then rose even further in the 1960s when they 
substituted for the import licences as the latter were removed (in 1960, with minor 
exceptions, in the case of Australia).
5 This trend over the 1950s and 1960s contrasted 
strongly with what other high-income countries were doing at that time, which was 
                                                 
4 It is thus a generalization of the nominal rate of border protection due, for example, to an import tariff, 
which is the percentage by which the domestic price is raised above the import unit value. 
5 The first major tariffs for the Australia federation were imposed in 1907. According to the indexes 
constructed by Carmody (1952), by the 1920s the decade average of the general tariff on Australia’s 
imports of items other than food beverages and tobacco was double that 1907 level, and by the 1930s it 
averaged 60 percent higher than in the 1920s. Vernon (1965) reports averages for tariffs above 12.5 percent 
for the period from 1938-39 to 1962-63: they dipped a bit in the late 1940s/early 1950s when import 
licences became the binding constraint but by the early 1960s they were back to the level of the late 1930s. 
The annual average level of protection since World War 2 is indicated by the carefully constructed customs 




lowering tariffs on manufactures as part of multilateral trade negotiation under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
6 Hence by the early 1970s the average 
ANZ manufacturing tariff exceeded that of any other OECD country (Anderson and 
Garnaut 1987). 
  Meanwhile, the ANZ governments intervened in numerous markets for farm 
products, but the subsidies and protection they provided to agricultural industries was 
only a modest offset to the indirect disincentives caused by manufacturing protection 
during this era. In the immediate post-World War II period, Australia’s agricultural 
programs were directly taxing the farm sector. Most of that was removed by the end of 
the Korean War, at which time farmers were enjoying a boom in export prices that 
spurred the highest inflation in Australia since its gold-rush era of the 1850s. Farm 
assistance then rose gradually such that by the end of the 1960s the nominal rate of 
assistance averaged 17 percent in Australia, whereas in New Zealand it averaged little 
more than 2 percent until the mid-1970s (Tables 2 and 3 and Appendix Tables 4 and 6).  
A striking feature of Australia’s agricultural assistance at that time (and of New 
Zealand’s when it increased assistance to livestock products for a dozen years from 1975) 
was that it applied to export industries as much as to import-competing ones (Figure 4). 
Export industries in Australia such as wheat, manufactured dairy products, sugar and 
dried vine fruit were assisted by so-called price stabilization schemes, although they often 
also contained so-called home consumption price schemes whereby domestic consumers 
were forced to pay more than the export price (Sieper 1982, Edwards 2006). These 
schemes, which required the pooling of domestic and export returns, could only be 
implemented with the support of the Australian state governments.
7 Other policy 
measures included fertilizer subsidies, income tax incentives, rural credit measures, 
                                                 
6 The GATT came into effect in 1948. Even though Australia and New Zealand were founding signatories 
to that agreement, they both chose not to join the commitments to cut manufacturing tariffs – out of 
frustration with the unwillingness of other GATT contracting parties to commit to lowering their 
agricultural protection rates (Arndt 1965, Snape 1984, Capling 2001). 
7 That pooling was inefficient in at least two senses: it led to excessive volumes of production because 
producers received the average rather than the marginal price; and because there was little differentiation in 
terms of quality and variety, producers were discouraged from seeking out niche markets by differentiating 
their product. Additional stabilization schemes were implemented by individual states, such as for fresh 
milk and eggs, and these led to different incentives in the various states. These were possible only by the 
states agreeing not to trade across state borders, in contravention of Section 92 of the Constitution which 




involvement in and subsidies to agricultural research and extension, and public 
investment in land and water development and rural infrastructure – but all those 
measures combined added the equivalent of no more than 2 percent to farmers’ gross 
income as of the early 1970s. 
  The net effect of both farm and nonfarm policies on agricultural incentives is 
summarized in Figure 5 and the final column of Appendix Tables 4 to 6. For Australia, 
the negative effect on incentives from agricultural policies in the 1940s was trivial 
compared with that from non-agricultural ones, mostly import protection for 
manufacturers: together those policies effectively reduced farmers’ gross returns by more 
than 20 percent. The price stabilization and other agricultural policies gradually provided 
more direct assistance to Australian farmers over the 1950s and 1960s when 
manufacturing protection remained steady, so that degree of taxation fell from 20+ 
percent to just 4 percent by 1971-72. New Zealand farmers, meanwhile, were effectively 
taxed an average of over 20 percent right through to 1972-73. The ANZ experience to the 
early 1972s was thus very similar to the degree of anti-agricultural bias in many 
developing countries in those decades. 
  Meanwhile, by the late 1960s the home consumption price schemes were 
imposing tax equivalents of over 100 percent on Australian consumers of butter, cheese, 
sugar and eggs (Appendix Table 7). These distortions are unusual in that the imposition 
they imposed on consumers or users of exportables was greater than the price impact on 
producers – something that does not arise from standard trade barriers.  
 
The reforms from the early 1970s 
 
Disenchantment with the interventionist trade and related economic policies gradually 
spread in the 1960s, but it was not until the 1970s that major tariff reductions began. In 
Australia a 25 per cent across-the-board cut in July 1973, preceded by some minor cuts in 
1970-71, started the tariff reform process. It was accelerated in the 1980s and continued 
through the 1990s. As a result, the average nominal rate of assistance to Australian 
manufacturing fell from 23 to 3 percent, and the effective rate from 36 to 5 per cent over 




Australia's import tariffs on goods halved. This brought the average tariff for 
manufactures down to 4.2 per cent in 1999.
8 The only manufacturers with significant 
tariff protection now are motor vehicles and parts, and textiles, clothing and footwear. 
Excluding them, the average effective rate of assistance to Australian manufacturing is 
just 3 per cent (Productivity Commission 2000a).
9  
Australia’s agricultural subsidies and regulatory interventions also have been 
close to eliminated over those 35 years. The average nominal rate of assistance to the 
farm sector has fallen from 16 per cent in the early 1970s to less than 2 per cent this 
decade. The process was piecemeal
10 and gradual, often involving a series of partial 
steps, but it was persistent. It began in 1972 with manufacturing milk and then two to 
four years later with cotton and tobacco, while it took another decade before supports for 
rice and eggs began to be dismantled, and almost a further decade for cuts to grape 
industry assistance. And it was not without at least one significant reversion, with the 
introduction of the reserve price scheme for wool in 1973 that took until the early 1990s 
to unravel.
11 There were just two farm groups still benefiting significantly from 
government programs in the latter 1990s: tobacco and milk producers, each with an NRA 
of more than 20 percent in 1997. Deregulation of tobacco marketing arrangements began 
in 1995 and was completed in 2000, bringing effective assistance to tobacco growing 
down from 30 to 2 per cent over that period. As from 1 July 2000, the remaining 
impediments to a free domestic market in fluid milk began to be dismantled, for which 
                                                 
8 This is still higher than for other OECD countries though (World Bank 2006). And WTO-bound tariffs 
average more than twice the applied rates. However, Australia uses non-tariff import barriers less 
frequently than other OECD countries, apart perhaps from anti-dumping duties (Productivity Commission 
2000a, 2000b, 2004). 
9 Tariffs on motor vehicle imports fell from 40 to 15 per cent over the 1990s and were cut again to 10 per 
cent in 2005; for clothing the decline over the 1990s was from 55 to 25 per cent, and for footwear from 45 
to 15 per cent, with cuts to 17.5 and 10 per cent in 2005, respectively Further cuts, to as little as 5 percent, 
are scheduled for 2010 (Productivity Commission 2000a, Table 4.4). 
10 By contrast, the reductions in manufacturing protection were more systematic: the 1973 across-the-board 
tariff cut, a Tariff Review program begun in 1971 by the Tariff Board and subsequently conducted by its 
successors (the Industries Assistance/Industry/Productivity Commission), and the pre-announced phased 
reductions in tariffs on textiles, clothing footwear and motor vehicles and parts from 1988. 
11 This stabilization scheme operated conservatively for 15 years until the government transferred the 
power to set the reserve price to growers in 1987. Growers promptly raised that reserve price – which 
operated on the world market – by 71 percent. Predictably this encouraged growers to expand wool 
production and international buyers to reduce purchases (since the Australian Wool Corporation would then 
stockpile wool and thereby save the buyer the cost of storage). The scheme collapsed in 1991 and the AWC 
had to dispose of its 4.75 million bales, at some expense to the government and at great expense to 




compensation to dairy farmers has been paid over the eight years to 2008 (as provided 
also to tobacco producers in the late 1990s). In the case of dairy, this compensation was 
funded by a consumer levy at the retail level 
In New Zealand, the anti-agricultural bias declined first by a one-third reduction 
in import tariffs protecting manufacturing in the latter 1960s/early 1970s and then by a 
big boost to beef, sheep and dairy farmer assistance from 1975. In these two steps the 
effective taxation of agriculture (the negative of the Relative Rate of Assistance) fell 
from 22 to 14 and then to less than 7 percent. It fell further over the next dozen years as 
agricultural assistance increased slightly while manufacturing protection continued to fall 
slightly, then it rose a little from the late 1980s as assistance to farmers fell faster than 
that to manufacturing, and finally it fell to just 1 percent as the last of the interventions 
were removed from the late 1990s (Figure 5). 
Thus distortionary government assistance to both manufacturing and agriculture, 
and hence the overall anti-agricultural bias, has now all but disappeared in both Australia 
and New Zealand – after being in place for more than seven decades.
12 Farmers also have 
benefited from the fact that service sectors too have not been spared reform in these 
countries. Banking, post and telecommunications, ports, higher education, health, and 
rail, air and sea transport have been opened up; there has been progressive out-sourcing 
of many government services; and substantial reforms to competition policy and practice, 
including privatization and the corporatization and de-monopolization of numerous 
government enterprises, are well advanced.
13 Moreover, by 1983 the currency was 
floating and foreign investment flows began to be freed up in both countries. That 
complemented financial sector reform and contributed to foreign direct investment, 
equity and foreign currency transactions growing at several times the pace of GDP. Even 
                                                 
12 Effective assistance to the mining sector is still slightly negative, as it was two decades ago (Industry 
Commission 1992, Appendix K; Productivity Commission 2004, Chapter 2.5), although that will be less so 
when the government eases the current quantitative restrictions on exports of uranium and its derivatives.   
13 In addition, a comprehensive program of review of government regulations at all levels in Australia has 
been under way since the mid-1990s, with the aim of reducing/removing regulations that unjustifiably 
impede economic activities (Productivity Commission 2000b). For an early assessment of Australia’s 
domestic microeconomic reforms, see Forsyth (1992, 2000). All Productivity Commission reports on the 
myriad reforms are downloadable at www.pc.gov.au. Recent research on barriers to trade in a wide range 
of services in almost 40 countries found that services markets in Australia, relative to those in the other 
countries in the study, are now ranked as either very liberal (banking, distribution services, telecoms, 
engineering professional services) or moderately restrictive (other professional services, maritime services) 




the previously highly unionised labour markets have undergone considerable reform. 
Households have gained substantially from these widespread reforms, including 
consumers of food who for most of the past two decades have faced tax equivalents of 
well below 10 percent on their food purchases (compared with the OECD average of 
between 23 and 36 percent over that period – see Appendix Table 8 and OECD 2006).  
 
 
Reasons behind the policy evolution 
 
  [To be  added] 
 
 
Prospects for further policy reform 
 
 
Notwithstanding the huge amount of ANZ reform over the past two decades, plenty of 
agricultural policy issues remain on the table. The key ones are in the resource and 
environmental areas. Three are mentioned briefly, by way of illustration. 
   The first is food and agricultural import restrictions for the protection of plant, 
animal and human health. The economic protection from import competition that this 
provides farmers has not been fully captured in the Productivity Commission’s NRA 
estimates, especially for horticultural products. Some of that protection may well be 
warranted on externality grounds, but some (such as a complete ban on imports of certain 
fruits from all countries) may be excessive from a national welfare viewpoint. The 
government is slowly examining whether various measures are excessively restrictive, 
but mainly in response to pressure from other WTO members seeking greater market 
access. Typically consumer costs are not included in such assessments, nor are all the 
cheaper ways of reducing any costs associated with the importation of disease (James and 
Anderson 1998). New Zealand in particular would be a beneficiary of a more-liberal 




  Second, both Australia and New Zealand have so far not allowed the growing of 
genetically modified (GM) varieties of farm products, with the sole exceptions of cotton 
and carnations in Australia, and GM food can be sold only if strict labelling standards are 
adhered to (FSANZ 2007). This may or may not be in their economies’ and consumers’ 
interests depending on its impact on market access abroad for ANZ farm products and on 
human health and the environment at home (Anderson and Jackson 2005), but emotion 
has played more of a role in formulating these policies than has sound technical and 
economic analysis. 
  Third, water policy was already becoming a major economic and political issue 
but was brought to a head in Australia following the country’s worst drought on record in 
2006. There has been substantial reform in recent years. Much remains to be done to 
make the most of this resource, particularly in rural Australia where the majority of it is 
used but proposals for reform and several national enquiries are under way (see, e.g., 
Productivity Commission 2006). More-efficient pricing of that resource may lead to 
substantial reallocations of resources within the agricultural sector, with possible declines 
in Australian production of cotton, rice, and milk as horticultural industries (and urban 
areas) bid away water from those farmers.
14 
  The remaining big frontier for policy reform that would boost farm incomes in 
Australia and New Zealand is the dismantling of agricultural subsidies and import 
protection abroad. The WTO’s Doha round provides the greatest promise for achieving 
that, notwithstanding the current suspension of trade negotiations, and ANZ farmers and 
the ANZ economies would be among the major beneficiaries of a significant conclusion 
to that round (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006). 
 
 
Policy lessons for other economies 
 
 
                                                 
14 The impact of past under-pricing of water for agriculture on farm returns has not been incorporated in the 




By way of conclusion, two lessons are worth emphasizing from the Australia and New 
Zealand experiences. For agricultural-subsidizing countries, these case studies show that 
removing even the largest and longest-lasting farm subsidies is possible. Even in 
Australia’s case where that was done by providing generous adjustment assistance, that 
support was time-bound rather than providing on-going income support, and it was able 
to be financed simply by delaying the rewards to domestic consumers rather than via 
outlays from (and hence resistance by) the treasury.  
For developing countries still effectively taxing their agricultural sectors, these 
two case studies offer hope that good policy analysis and advisory institutions can alter 
the political economy sufficiently to remove that taxation. More than that, the ANZ cases 
also illustrate the growth dividend that can come from reforming such distortionary 
policies. Having now dismantled virtually all their import protection and agricultural 
subsidy policy distortions, and having undertaken major domestic macro- and micro-
economic reforms over the past two plus decades, the fruits of that undertaking are 
beginning to be reaped. The impact on overall living standards was mentioned at the 
outset, but an indicator within the agricultural sector is the acceleration it has given to 
farm productivity growth.  
It needs to be borne in mind that ANZ farmers have not been immune from the 
standard ‘small farm problem’ that requires them to ‘get big or get out’ as the economy 
develops. It is true that their farm sizes were large relative to those in most other market 
economies in the early post-World War II years, and that the ‘wool boom’ of the early 
1950s provided massive incomes for woolgrowers. Nonetheless, as wages grew 
elsewhere in the economy, the need to adjust was felt strongly in ANZ just as elsewhere 
(McKay 1967); and it manifest itself in the same way, that is, with farmers funding 
agricultural research and adapting and adopting the new technologies it generated as 
appropriate, and with the number of farms and farmers declining steadily to lower the 
labor intensity of the sector even as output expanded (Appendix Figure 6). 
Within that context, the removal of the anti-agricultural policy bias over the past 
30 years has, with a not-unexpected delay, boosted the rate of ANZ farm productivity 
substantially. Figure 6 shows that in New Zealand, TFP growth slowed during the dozen 




subsidies were removed along with manufacturing protection. This has been reflected in 
farm land prices: after initially halving when the subsidy cuts were announced in the 
early 1980s, they more than recovered in real terms by the turn of the century as farmers 
profitably adjusted to the new deregulated, level-playing-field domestic economic 
environment (Figure 7).  
In Australia, farm multifactor productivity (MFP) growth increased following the 
international price hikes in 1973-74, but then plateaued during the next decade until the 
reforms from the mid-1980s began to have their effect (Figure 6). In the 1983-93 period 
farm MFP grew at just 1.4 percent per year, but during 1993-2000 its growth rate was 4.1 
percent (Productivity Commission 2005, p.121). Similar results are reported in Parham 
(2004): less than 1.5 percent during 1974-88, then 2.6 percent in 1988-93 and 4.3 percent 
in 1993-98. His estimates show that even that earlier rate of 1.5 percent compares 
favourably with that for the rest of Australia’s economy which was well below 1 percent 
during 1973-93 (and only 1.8 percent in 1993-98). 
Clearly, farmers are capable not only of surviving without subsidies, but of 
becoming more productive with their removal – and not with any obviously faster rate of 
decline in the total number of farmers or farms that occurs with normal economic growth 
(see Appendix Table 6).
15 Certainly it helps if assistance to non-agricultural sectors is cut 
at the same time, which is relevant for many developing countries (although not for other 
high-income countries where manufacturing protection rates are already low). But these 
two case studies contradict one view in the economic growth literature that natural 
resource abundance (including a comparative advantage in agriculture) is a curse rather 
than a blessing.
16 
Getting domestic policies right in the resource and environmental area, and 
securing tariff and subsidy cuts from the Doha Development Agenda, will yield even 
further productivity growth for farmers in Australia and New Zealand. But those are 
stories for the future. 
                                                 
15 Adjustment has been sharper within individual industries of course, especially those that faced dramatic 
cuts in subsidies. In the case of the Australian dairy industry, the number of farms halved in the 25 years 
following the start if its assistance cuts in the early 1970s (Harris 2005a). 
16 On this literature in general and its applicability to Latin America, see Lederman and Moloney (2006). 
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Table 1: Sectoral composition of GDP, employment and exports, Australia and New 
Zealand, 1820 to 2005-06 
(percent, at current prices) 
(a) Australia 
GDP share   Agriculture  Mining   Manufacturing  Services  TOTAL 
1820-24 53            4  43  100 
1861-64 23  15  13  49  100 
1880-84 24  5  24  47  100 
1910-14 23  6  23  48  100 
1950-54 22  2  29  47  100 
1960-64 16  2  28  54  100 
1970-74 9  3  26  62  100 
1980-84 5  6  20  69  100 
1990-94 3  5  15  78  100 
2005-06 3  4  11  82  100 
 
Employment  Agriculture  Mining   Manufacturing  Services  TOTAL 
1962-63 10  1  26  63  100 
1972-73 7  1  24  68  100 
1982-83 6  1  19  74  100 
1993-94 5  1  14  80  100 




Agriculture  Mining   Other 
merchandise 
Services  TOTAL 
1950-51 86  6  3  5  100 
1962-63 66  8  13  13  100 
1972-73 44  28  12  16  100 
1982-83 39  34  11  16  100 
1993-94 26  41  14  19  100 





Table 1 (continued): Sectoral composition of GDP, employment and exports, Australia 
and New Zealand, 1820 to 2005-06 
(percent, at current prices) 
 
(b) New Zealand 
GDP share  Agriculture  Industry  Services  TOTAL 
1950-54        100 
1960-64        100 
1970-74 11  32  57  100 
1980-84 9  32  59  100 
1990-94 8  25  67  100 
1995-99 7  24  69  100 




Agriculture  Other 
primary 
Manufacturing  Services  TOTAL 
1960-64 14        100 
1970-74 12        100 
1980-84 11        100 
1990-94 10        100 
1995-99 9        100 










Services  TOTAL 
1960-64 83  0  4  13  100 
1970-74 70  2  10  18  100 
1980-84 58  5  18  19  100 
1990-94 50  5  23  22  100 
1995-99 47  5  24  24  100 
2000-04 44  5  24  27  100 
 
Sources: ABARE (2007), Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2006) and, for Australian 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Openness indicators, Australia and New Zealand plus other high-income 
countries,
a 1865 to 1993 
(percent, five-year averages) 










































































Figure 2 (continued): Openness indicators, Australia and New Zealand plus other high-
income countries,
a 1865 to 1993 
(percent, five-year averages) 
 

















































































a Weighted average for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, using mid-period 
imports as the weights for each 5-year period. Data for Australia pre-1901 are from 
Maloney (2002). 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all
a 
agricultural industries, Australia and New Zealand, 1946 to 2005 



























































































































































Total Agricultural NRA Import competing Exportables
 
a The total NRA can be above both the exportable and importable averages because 
assistance to nontradables (eg, eggs) and non-product-specific assistance is also included. 
 




Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance to manufacturing, all non-agricultural tradables, all 
agricultural tradable industries, and relative rate of assistance,
a Australia and New 
Zealand, 1946-47 to 2003-04 





























































































































































All Agricultural tradables All Non-Agricultural tradables
Relative rate of Assistance, RRAc Non-Food Manufacture
 
a The RRA is defined as [100(1+NRAag
t/100)/(1+NRAnonag
t/100) – 1] 




Figure 6: Real agricultural total/multi-factor productivity growth, Australia and New 
Zealand, 1927 to 2004 
 

















































































































































(b) New Zealand 























































Figure 7: Real farmland prices, New Zealand, 1978 to 2004 



















































Measuring the nominal rates of assistance to agricultural commodities 
 
Australia’s Industries Assistance Commission began calculating estimates of the nominal 
rates of assistance for major agricultural commodities beginning with the year 1970-71. 
(All years are fiscal, beginning 1 July.)  This series has been continued by its successors, 
the Industry Commission and the Productivity Commission.
17 There are four breaks in 
the series as each sub-series is benchmarked to the reference years 1970-71, 1983-84, 
1990-91 and 1996-97. There are some differences between estimates for these periods. 
For example, the first three series were compiled on an agricultural commodity basis. On 
the other hand, for the latest (1996-97 benchmarked) series, the Productivity Commission 
moved to a ANZSIC industry-based classification of activities, in line with the 
methodology used for the manufacturing sector industries. For this reason, the series for 
most individual commodities is not available from 1999-2000. The changes are detailed 
in Productivity Commission (2002, Methodological Annex A).   
  For the years before 1970-71, the only comprehensive series available is that 
published in Lloyd (1973, pp. 149-58), which was prepared by Australia’s Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics. They followed one of the methods used by Harris (1964) in his 
pioneering paper on agricultural protection in Australia, as explained in Lloyd (1973, 
Appendix Notes). They cover the major agricultural commodities for which data were 
available at the time, for the years 1946-47 to 1970-71. The Lloyd/BAE series and the PC 
series use essentially the same methods. Commodities are designated as either export or 
import commodities and then direct estimates of the implicit price changes to producers 
resulting from agricultural assistance were made and expressed as a percentage of the 
export or (in the case of tobacco and cotton pre-1970) import parity price. Appendix 
Table 1 reports the Lloyd/BAE and the PC series for the main distorted commodities. 
(For milk prior to 1970-71, we took a simple average of the Lloyd/BAE estimates for 
Butter and Cheese, shown in Appendix Table 4, to get the milk NRA shown in Table 2 
for those years.)  
  The two series provide estimates for one year in common, 1970-71. This common 
year provides a check on the comparability of the two series. As shown at the bottom of 
Appendix Table 4, the estimates for the common year are reasonably close with the 
exceptions of tobacco and eggs. For tobacco the differences are explained by differences 
in the source of imports used to establish the import parity price. Imports of tobacco leaf 
used in the manufacture of tobacco products in Australia varies greatly in quality and 
price by source. The choice of source to establish the import parity price is discussed at 
length in reports by the Industries Assistance Commission (1981, Appendix 5; 1983a, 
chapter 6.4; and 1983b, Section 4.2).  For eggs, it is not clear why the Lloyd/BAE and the 
PC series give such widely different estimates of the level of assistance, as they cover the 
                                                 
17 On the history and workings of this remarkable transparency agency and the policy reform process of 




same forms of assistance and use similar methods. That industry has a very small weight 
in the sectoral aggregate, however, so it does not affect the average NRA for the sector as 
a whole. For the larger range of industries examined by the Productivity Commission 
from 1970-71, we report their NRA estimates in Appendix Table 5.  
  For the industries covered by the Commission but not by Lloyd, ‘guesstimates’ 
have been made for the years before 1970, based on the policy descriptions in Edwards 
(2006) and the references cited therein. The only guesstimate of significant size is for 
wine grapes, whose NRA is assumed to equal that estimated by Lloyd for dried vine fruit 
up to 1970. All the other industries had either no assistance (maize, oats, rapeseed, 
soybean, bananas, olives, wool, beef, sheepmeat, pigmeat, chicken meat) or a very small 
weight in the total gross value of farm production (for the 1950s and 1960s: apples 6 
percent, oranges 25 percent and potatoes 8 percent; and zero NRA for all three pre-1950-
51), this introduces little uncertainty as to the average for the sector.   
  To obtain the weighted averages for agriculture as a whole shown in Table 4, we 
assumed the NRA was zero for products not covered by the above estimates and 
‘guesstimates’. This is reasonable since those not covered are mostly small horticultural 
industries which are not subject to market interventions (apart from quarantine 
restrictions, which are in place purportedly for health rather than economic protection 
reasons). For weights we used gross value of production at undistorted prices, calculated 
by dividing that value at domestic producer prices by (1+NRA/100).  
  The Commission has used a new, less-disaggregated industry classification from 
2000-01 (see Productivity Commission 2004, Appendix B), which provides direct 
estimates for only dairy, poultry and pig farming. Since all the others have very close to 
zero nominal assistance, that has been assumed for all but two products whose 1999-00 
values are assumed to continue to 2003-04 (rice 1.7 percent and oranges 0.6 percent).   
  The final column in Appendix Tables 4 and 5 includes ‘non-product-specific’ 
assistance (including all assistance via factor and intermediate input markets, even though 
some of that is in fact product-specific), estimates of which are taken from the 
Productivity Commission for the period from 1970. We assume them to have been 1.8 
percent of the gross value of farm production in 1969, 2 percent in 1960, 0.5 percent in 
1946, and linear interpolations between those years. 
  Lloyd (1993, Table 10.6) also provides consumer tax equivalents for his set of 
products, reproduced in Appendix Table 7. And in the Appendix Table 8 we reproduce 
the CTE values for subsequent years as calculated by the OECD (2006). 
 
Measuring the nominal rates of assistance to non-agricultural tradable commodities 
 
  The Productivity Commission has not provided systematic NRA estimates for 
mining for every year, but for those years it has done so in recent decades the values vary 
within the range of -1 to +1 percent. We therefore simply assume that sector’s NRA has 
been zero since 1960 when the ban on iron ore and coal was lifted. We also assume it is 
zero for other primary products, since they are not subject to government interventions 
other than for resource and environmental conservation reasons (and in any case they 
represent a tiny fraction of GDP). 
  Estimates of the NRA for manufacturing for the period prior to 1968-69, when 




were also protective quantitative restrictions on imports of manufactures (ostensibly for 
balance of payments reasons in the presence of fixed exchange rates), but since we do not 
have estimates of the protective effects of those import licences, we simply assume their 
impact on the average NRA for non-agricultural tradables is exactly offset by the 
negative impact of the ban on key mining exports in those years.
18  
  Since Australia’s imports pre-1970 were almost exclusively manufactures, 
customs revenue as a percentage of the value of all merchandise imports provides a 
reasonable proxy for the country’s nominal rate of tariff protection for manufacturing. 
Data for that indicator are reported for Australia and New Zealand, together with several 
other industrial countries, in Appendix Table 1 for 1870 to 1993. They are also reported 
in Appendix Table 3 from 1944-45 along with that referring just to dutiable imports, 
using data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, previously the Commonwealth 
Bureau of Census and Statistics, CBCS). The latter were compiled by Lloyd (2006). 
Since these series relate to customs duties only they do not include assistance due to non-
tariff measures, apart from anti-dumping and countervailing duties and also revenue 
duties (“Primage”). They include an adjustment for refunds and drawbacks of customs 
duties, and they include primage duties where applicable because these added significant 
protection to Australian producers of many goods. The first column also includes duties 
levied on excisable goods,
19 and refers to actual rates levied on imports, thereby 
combining MFN, preferential and concessional tariffs on final goods and intermediate or 
capital inputs. Since those inputs that were not competitive with Australian-produced 
goods were admitted duty free under by-law and concessional import schemes, the series 
has long been regarded as less useful than the series of the average tariff on dutiable 
imports only. Thus the best available series measuring the average nominal protection 
due to the Australian tariff over the period to 1968 (after which more-comprehensive 
Productivity Commission estimates are available) is that in the second column of 
Appendix Table 3.  
  Both tariff series in Appendix Table 3 are averages calculated using import 
weights. The problem of selecting weights has vexed economists worldwide since the 
pioneering study on this subject by the League of Nations (1927). In Australia, it vexed 
economists from the time of the first attempts to consider the problem by Crawford 
(1930) and Carmody (1952). The method of calculating the average tariff by dividing the 
total duty collected by the value of imports is of course simply an arithmetic mean, using 
the percentage of imports of each good in the current period as the weights (a Paasche 
Index). This statistic has the desirable statistical properties that the weights are all 
positive fractions and sum to unity. Since the time of the League of Nations study it has 
been standard practice to object to the use of import weights on the ground that this 
practice understates the relative importance of goods subject to high tariffs. In particular, 
prohibitive tariffs, which are extremely important from a welfare point of view, receive a 
                                                 
18 In years prior to the 1950s, the relatively low international prices of mineral and energy products (world 
Bank 2000), combined with the very high cost of transporting bulky coal and iron ore from Australia to the 
North Atlantic’s industrial hub, means that export ban was probably redundant – other than to signal 
Australia’s unwillingness at that time to provide industrial raw materials to Japan. For more on mining 
policies historically, see Doran (1984), and on mineral taxation in particular, see Gruen (1978, Ch. 4). 
19 The duty collected should be adjusted to cover only the margin over the excise duty levied on like 




zero weight. But this is not a fatal objection. The simplest and most instructive way to 
view this is with a partial equilibrium version of the Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(Anderson and Neary 1994, Anderson 1995), using the formula for the tariff’s welfare 
loss on each good due to Harberger (1959, 1964) or some restatement of the formula in 
terms of equivalent variation (rather than the Marshallian triangle for the consumer 
surplus component).  When this formula is used, the average tariff is defined as the single 
uniform tariff that would result in the same aggregate loss to the economy as the structure 
of differentiated tariffs. Amazingly, this turns out to be the mean of order two, not the 
arithmetic mean or the geometric mean favoured by the League of Nations (1927) and 
some others since.  This choice of mean reflects the importance of the Harberger “square 
rule”, that is, the loss of welfare due to a tariff is proportional to the square of the (ad 
valorem) tariff rate.
20  Because the arithmetic mean obtained by dividing the revenue by 
the value of imports (total or dutiable only) is the only readily available index from long 
time series, it simply needs to be recognized that the resultant import-weighted average of 
the tariff rates on individual goods understates the true figure because it uses current 
period import weights and because it uses the ad valorem (or ad valorem equivalent) rates 
rather than the squares of these rates. However, it is the best we can do, and it is better 
than using any other system of weights in an arithmetic mean or the unweighted mean.  
For the period since 1968-69, the Productivity Commission (and its predecessors 
the Industries Assistance Commission and the Industry Commission) provides estimates 
of both nominal and effective rates of assistance to manufacturing, for industry sub-
categories down to the 4-digit level. In addition to tariffs these cover subsidies, bounties 
and discriminatory sales taxes but initially did not cover quantitative restrictions, content 
plans, etc. (Industries Assistance Commission 1976, p.4). The latter are covered for the 
later period from 1982-83 though. The average nominal assistance on outputs for the 
whole sector is reproduced in the final column of Appendix Table 3. The treatment of 
tariffs and para-tariffs differs in some respects from that in the other two columns. The 
Commission uses General (MFN) tariff rates, except for those few items where imports 
are overwhelmingly from the preferential source. For excisable goods, the Commission 
includes only the margin of protection. Both of these procedures are preferable, but the 
differences they make to the estimates are small. Probably of more importance, the 
Commission’s estimates of nominal rates of assistance use production weights at 
unassisted prices, which are preferable for current purposes than import weights. 
Nonetheless, the average tariff on dutiable imports may be as reliable an indicator of the 
turning points and trends in the levels of assistance to the manufacturing sector as the 
Commission’s series.   
  The calculation of the two tariff series is not just a simple matter of transcribing 
the customs revenue and import values for each year and dividing. First, there is a break 
                                                 
20 Thus the weighting problem with the import-weighted mean is not the use of import weights but the 
incorrect choice of current period import weights rather than the free trade situation weights. And one 
should calculate the mean of order two, not the arithmetic mean (which is the mean of order one). It is easy 
to show by example that the use of current period import weights and the use of the arithmetic mean can 
both result in serious understatements of the true welfare-relevant average tariff. But the estimation of free 
trade weights is difficult. And the calculation of the square of the tariff rates is a huge job in each year of a 
time series as it requires the explicit statement of the ad valorem rates for each tariff item or, worse, the 




in the series in 1988-89 at which time the ABS switched to electronic recording. We 
obtained from the ABS an electronic copy of the annual revised series of Import 
Clearances and Duty paid on all imports, cross-classified by the rate of duty and type of 
imports (Normal, Concessional, Government) for the years 1988-89 to 2004-05. Then the 
averages calculated from these series can be compared with the averages calculated from 
the hard copy figures published for earlier years, although there are minor differences due 
to the different treatment of Refunds and Drawbacks in the electronic series. 
  Second, for the pre-electronic series, CBCS and ABS published the figures on 
different bases over different periods. It is necessary to make several adjustments to 
obtain a series which maintains a consistent definition of duties collected and of the 
values of imports cleared home consumption. One problem is that, in the pre-electronic 
period that spans the 38 years from 1949-50 to 1987-88, some of the series are reported 
in gross terms and some in net terms, that is, net of Refunds and Drawbacks of Customs 
and Primage Duties. A second problem is that some revenue duties are excluded in the 
figures of customs duties collected and some are included. These problems are discussed 
in turn.   
After the end of each financial year, refunds and drawbacks are made of some 
duties collected because the duties were levied improperly in the first instance or because 
the imports were found to be eligible for drawback as the goods in which the imports 
were incorporated were subsequently exported. Any series of average duties which is 
intended to measure the protective effect of import duties should use duty statistics which 
are net of both refunds and drawbacks. Prior to 1988-89, statistics published by the 
CBCS/ABS are sometimes reported on a gross basis and sometimes on a net basis. The 
net figures have been used where available. Where not available,  the total value of 
Refunds and Drawbacks for each year is published separately and has been used in the 
calculation of the adjusted series of average duty on dutiable imports (see below). From 
1988-89, there is no longer a series of refunds and drawbacks. The ABS receives a daily 
file from the Customs Department of all records cleared the previous day. The daily file 
records any adjustments to a record previously lodged with Customs and the ABS records 
are amended as long as the original files are kept. Since previous records are kept for just 
six months, only those refunds and drawbacks which are recorded within six months of 
the original clearances are netted. Those refunds and drawbacks that take more than six 
months to be processed are not reflected in the ABS data. For this reason, there is a minor 
inconsistency between the pre-electronic and the post-electronic statistics, the latter 
overstating slightly the true value of net customs duty collected.  
Over the period since 1950, four different revenue duties have been levied for 
sub-periods. These duties are troublesome for the calculation of a consistent series of 
average tariffs. There are four types: 
(i) Primage duties were introduced in 1930 and remained until the last primage 
duties were abolished on 1 January 1983. They were introduced as a revenue tax, mainly 
on luxury items, but they applied to imports of many goods produced in Australia as 
wells to some non-competitive imports and, for these goods, they provided additional 
protection.
21 They were ad valorem duties and in the early part of our 50-year period the 
                                                 
21 Goods which were the produce or manufacture of New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and some other 




most common rate was 10 per cent. In the early 1950s primage duties amounted to almost 
10 per cent of the total duties including primage, and therefore added significantly to the 
measured levels of protection from the Australian tariff. However, from the mid-1950s, 
the number of tariff items on which primage was levied was steadily reduced by the 
abolition of some of these duties or by their incorporation in normal duties, and the rates 
were also lowered. By the mid-1960s they amounted to roughly 2 per cent only of the 
total duties collected. To maintain a consistent series, for the years in which they applied 
we incorporated the revenue collected in the statistics of total duty collected each year.  
(ii) A 2 per cent duty on items previously cleared free of duty was applied for 
almost nine years, from 1 July 1979 to 11 May 1988. This was a revenue measure, 
announced in May before the 1979 Budget and removed in the Budget of 1988. During 
the period in which it applied, this tax collected on average around $150 million each 
year. This amounted to about 7.5 percent of total duty collected during the period.  
(iii) A 3 per cent duty on imported business inputs which did not have a substitute 
manufactured in Australia was introduced before the Budget of 1996, effective from 1 
July 1996. This too was a revenue measure. However, there was an exemption for inputs 
used in the textile, clothing, footwear, motor vehicle and food industries. The duty 
remained until it was abolished in the Budget of 2005, effective from 11 May 2005, after 
a report by the Productivity Commission (2000) had recommended its abolition. During 
the period in which it applied, this tax collected around $200million each year, 
amounting to about 5 percent of total duty collected during the period. Since both the 2 
per cent and the 3 per cent duties were levied on non-competitive imported materials and 
inputs, they raised the prices in Australia of the goods concerned but they did not provide 
protection to Australian manufacturers. Indeed they reduced the effective rates of 
protection of those goods which used these inputs. The adjustments have been made each 
year by identifying, exactly or as closely as possible, the  goods cleared and subject to 
these duties, and then subtracting the value of duty collected from the revenue tax in the 
numerator and subtracting the value of the dutiable imports on which these duties were 
levied in the denominator.    
(iv) Excise taxes (specific duties levied on the production or manufacture of 
certain goods) in Australia apply to three main groups of goods, namely, alcoholic 
beverages excluding wine, tobacco products, and refined petroleum fuels. These duties 
are revenue taxes, levied on these so-called “sin goods” at high rates when expressed in 
ad valorem terms. All goods that are excisable when produced in Australia are subject to 
a specific tariff at a rate which is as higher than or as high as the excise duty rate on the 
corresponding domestic like product. When excise duty rates have been increased or 
decreased, the same adjustment has usually been made for the tariff on corresponding 
imports. All statistics of duty collected published by CBCS/ABS include the whole duty 
collected from the tariff rates on these items, rather than capturing just the margin of 
protection. Hence they overstate the rates of assistance to these excisable goods. 
The only published study that has calculated the ad valorem equivalent nominal rates of 
assistance to excisable goods is for the years 1950-51 to 1971-72 (Lloyd 1975). He found 
that the nominal rates of protection to excisable goods were generally high (the solitary 
exception was Motor Spirits) compared to those due to tariffs on non-excisable goods. 
However, he also found this protective part was on average less than one-quarter of the 




duty levied on excisable goods produced in Australia. However, since the customs duty 
collected on excisable goods is a small part of the total customs duty collected, this 
overstatement is not serious. And note that the Productivity Commission and its 
predecessors have included only the protective margin in their calculations of nominal 
rates of assistance to excisable goods.   
  To get the average nominal rate of assistance (NRA) for all non-agricultural 
tradables, we assumed only (and all) service sectors produce non-tradables, and a zero 
NRA for non-agricultural primary sectors. For manufacturing, we use the Productivity 
Commission NRA output estimates from 1968-69 (ignoring their estimates of net 
assistance via primary factor and intermediate input markets, which in the past decade 
would have lowered them by about one-fifth), while for earlier years the dutiable import 
tariff averages estimated by Lloyd are used (the second column in Appendix Table 3). 
The latter may overstate assistance to the sector in so far as some competing imports 
come in duty free; but that is assumed to be offset by the numerous non-tariff barriers to 
imports that were in place in the years prior to 1970. For the first two years of overlap in 
the two series in the late 1960s, they are almost identical (at 23 percent). 
 
 
(b) New Zealand 
 




Appendix Table 1: Customs revenue as a share of merchandise imports, Australia, New 
Zealand and other high-income countries, 1865 to 1993 
(percent, five-year averages) 
 
 Australia  New 
Zealand 




1865-69 na  na  na  na  42  na 
1870-74 na  16  na  12  35  11 
1875-79 10  16  na  16  29  11 
1880-84 9  19  na  19  29  11 
1885-89 11  21  na  21  30  12 
1890-94 13  24  na  18  23  10 
1895-99 14  24  43  17  23  10 
1900-04 19  20  30  16  27  11 
1905-09 20  18  21  16  23  10 
1910-14 19  16  18  16  18  9 
1915-19 19  16  12  17  8  4 
1920-24 20  15  14  13  12  9 
1925-29 22  17  17  14  13  11 
1930-34 32  23  24  15  19  15 
1935-39 30  21  22  13  15  13 
1940-44 14  28  13  9  11  8 
1945-49 21  31  12  10  7  8 
1950-54 15  17  38  9  5  6 
1955-59 10  13  29  9  6  7 
1960-64 12  13  27  9  7  6 
1965-69 10  13  31  7  7  5 
1970-74 12  8  41  6  5  2 
1975-79 11  5  28  5  3  1 
1980-84 10  5  32  4  3  1 
1985-89 9  6  20  4  3  1 
1990-93 6  3  9  3  3  1 
 
a Weighted average for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, using mid-period 
imports as the weights for each 5-year period. Nordic data pre-1900 refers just to 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, taken from Maloney (2002). Data for Australia pre-1901 
also are from Maloney (2002). 
 




Appendix Table 2: Merchandise exports plus imports as a share of GDP, Australia and 
New Zealand plus other high-income countries,
a 1865 to 2000 
(percent, five-year averages) 
 
 
 Australia  New 
Zealand 




1865-69 na  na  na  na  7  na 
1870-74 na  na  na  39  12  38 
1875-79 41  na  na  29  12  39 
1880-84 41  na  na  31  12  43 
1885-89 33  na  na  26  11  43 
1890-94 37  na  na  26  12  45 
1895-99 48  na  na  29  11  45 
1900-04 45  na  na  36  11  46 
1905-09 46  na  na  33  11  47 
1910-14 42  na  na  36  12  48 
1915-19 32  na  na  49  16  48 
1920-24 38  na  na  36  11  46 
1925-29 36  na  58  42  10  46 
1930-34 28  65  49  28  6  37 
1935-39 30  62  38  32  6  37 
1940-44 29  50  31  40  7  24 
1945-49 37  47  26  37  7  33 
1950-54 46  59  22  34  7  44 
1955-59 32  49  34  31  7  45 
1960-64 25  41  14  29  7  41 
1965-69 24  38  10  36  7  41 
1970-74 23  38  11  40  10  45 
1975-79 24  43  17  45  14  48 
1980-84 25  48  18  48  15  52 
1985-89 27  42  13  49  15  48 
1990-94 28  45  12  50  16  46 
1995-99 31  45  18  69  19  56 
2000 35  47  18  78  20  65 
 
a Weighted average for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, using mid-period 
imports as the weights for each 5-year period. Data after 1993 are from World Bank 
(2006) and for Australia pre-1901 are from Maloney (2002). 
 





Appendix Table 3: Customs revenue as a share of imports and nominal rate of assistance 
























1944-45 10.1  52.0  na  90.0  46.8 
1945-46 16.3  49.4  na  90.0  44.5 
1946-47 22.0  41.7  na  90.0 37.5 
1947-48 17.0  29.7  na  90.0 26.7 
1948-49 15.3  27.0  na  90.0 24.3 
1949-50 14.5  26.2  na  90.0 23.6 
1950-51 12.4  24.5  na  90.0 22.1 
1951-52 10.9  23.0  na  90.0 20.7 
1952-53 13.9  33.9  na  90.0 30.5 
1953-54 14.0  26.3  na  90.0 23.7 
1954-55 12.0  22.9  na  90.0 20.6 
1955-56 10.7  22.0  na  90.0 19.8 
1956-57 9.6  21.9  na  91.0 19.9 
1957-58 9.1  19.8  na  92.0 18.2 
1958-59 9.0  21.7  na  93.0 20.2 
1959-60 9.1  21.2  na  93.0 19.7 
1960-61 9.4  20.0  na  94.0 18.8 
1961-62 9.6  22.1  na  95.0 21.0 
1962-63 9.7  22.0  na  96.0 21.1 
1963-64 9.8  22.3  na  95.0 21.2 
1964-65 9.8  22.9  na  94.0 21.5 
1965-66 9.3  22.0  na  93.0 20.5 
1966-67 9.1  22.4  na  92.0 20.6 
1967-68 9.6  22.8  na  91.0 20.7 
1968-69 10.1  23.0  24.0  90.0 21.6 
1969-70 10.7  23.3  23.0  88.0 20.2 
1970-71 12.4  25.5  23.0  87.0 20.0 
1971-72 12.9  26.6  22.0  86.0 18.9 
1972-73 13.2  30.1  22.0  85.0 18.7 
1973-74 10.4  26.8  17.0  84.0 14.3 
1974-75 10.8  28.6  15.0  82.0 12.3 
1975-76 11.7  29.7  16.0  81.0 13.0 
1976-77 11.5  29.4  15.0  80.0 12.0 
1977-78 10.4  29.0  15.0  79.0 11.9 
1978-79 10.2  31.3  15.0  78.0 11.7 
1979-80 9.9  28.8 15.0  77.0 11.6 
1980-81 9.7  28.4 15.0  76.0 11.4 
1981-82 9.2  27.7 16.0  76.0 12.2 
1982-83 9.5  28.1 16.0  76.0 12.2 
1983-84 9.9  27.0 13.0  76.0 9.9 
1984-85 10.0  27.0  13.0  76.0 9.9 
1985-86 9.6  26.3 12.0  76.0 9.1 
1986-87 8.7  24.8 12.0  76.0 9.1 

























1988-89 8.3  23.5 10.0  76.0 7.6 
1989-90 8.0  22.9  9.0  76.0 6.8 
1990-91 7.3  21.3  9.0  77.0 6.9 
1991-92 6.9  20.4  8.0  77.0 6.2 
1992-93 6.0  18.9  7.0  76.0 5.3 
1993-94 5.4  17.1  6.0  74.0 4.4 
1994-95 4.9  16.1  5.0  73.0 3.7 
1995-96 4.3  14.7  5.0  72.0 3.6 
1996-97 4.4  12.2  3.5  72.0 2.5 
1997-98 4.4  11.3  3.3  71.0 2.3 
1998-99 4.1  10.9  3.2  71.0 2.2 
1999-00 3.7  10.6  3.0  71.0 2.1 
2000-01 4.0  11.2  2.8  71.0 2.0 
2001-02 4.0  10.4  2.8  71.0 2.0 
2002-03 3.9  10.0  2.8  71.0 2.0 
2003-04 3.9  10.0  2.8  72.0 2.0 
2004-05 3.5  9.5  2.6  72.0 1.9 
 
 
aNet of Refunds and Drawbacks of Customs and Primage Duties 
 
Sources: Lloyd (2006) based on data from Australian Bureau of Statistics files and, for 




Appendix Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance, main distorted agricultural products, 
Australia, annual 1946-47 to 1969-70 
(percent) 


















1946-47  -1.0 -44.3  na  1.6  na  3.0  1.4  5.9  7.5  na  -13.5 -12.0  -13.5 
1947-48  -4.0 -16.7 -23.9  -15.6  na  1.1  1.2  4.5  9.8  na -4.6 -3.6  -4.6 
1948-49  -4.4 -18.0 -16.7  -9.5  na -5.2  -0.2  1.8 12.0  na -4.9 -3.7  -4.9 
1949-50  -3.5 -17.9 -15.7  -9.2  na -5.5  -0.1  1.9 12.8  na -4.9 -3.7  -4.9 
1950-51  -14.2 -21.2 -18.0  -14.2  na  2.4  4.4  6.1  2.3  na -3.2 -1.7  -3.2 
1951-52  -7.2 -17.6 -14.5  -6.6  na 21.6  11.4  15.6 22.9  5.5 -1.1 0.1  -1.1 
1952-53  -0.8 -7.6 -1.2  3.7  na 8.8  24.1  25.8 4.0  22.2 2.5 3.3  2.5 
1953-54  5.9 -0.1  4.1  9.9  3.2 9.9  22.2  24.1 6.8  58.2 4.5 5.1  4.5 
1954-55  10.7 4.3 0.5 10.6  -2.6  30.9  22.9  30.3  6.5  79.5  6.1 6.4  6.1 
1955-56  10.1 1.2 4.5 10.0 5.4  35.0  32.0  13.0  4.2  48.4  5.3 5.9  5.3 
1956-57  8.9 -2.1  3.7  13.1 30.3  31.6  53.5  50.1 4.1  46.4 7.9 7.9  7.9 
1957-58  9.9 1.4  -0.4  7.7  30.9  48.8  89.8 100.5  3.7  45.7  11.0 10.3  11.0 
1958-59  12.8 2.5 2.2 15.4  23.8  57.0  43.0  11.5  4.1  58.2  6.5 7.5  6.5 
1959-60  15.3 6.6  10.6 17.8  43.3  46.3  40.0  35.4  11.9  56.4  8.4 8.9  8.4 
1960-61   13.8 8.2 3.8 22.9  42.9  58.2  78.9  34.6  11.0  29.2  10.1 11.0  10.1 
1961-62  11.6 6.9 3.2 27.9  -2.1  41.8  58.4  40.2  11.5  64.0  9.5 10.3  9.5 
1962-63  13.9 8.9 5.5 16.9  34.2  59.6  44.8  30.9  11.6  57.3  8.8 9.8  8.8 
1963-64  17.2 0.6 2.1 -2.6  93.2  55.6  41.4  31.9  7.5  44.1  6.1 7.2  6.1 
1964-65  18.5 5.9 0.9 14.2  92.3  94.0  41.8  27.7  6.8  40.0  8.2 9.1  8.2 
1965-66  13.0 7.1 1.7 26.6  106.0  138.2  51.1  32.6  11.7  62.4  10.3 10.6  10.3 
1966-67  10.5 3.4 2.2 30.5  86.8  100.0  51.4  38.4  13.4  46.1  8.6 9.6  8.6 
1967-68  11.4 18.8 13.2  38.9 75.5  129.5 94.4  89.9  15.2  48.3  15.4 15.4  15.4 
1968-69  15.7 8.2 2.9 37.4  61.4  187.9  107.2 105.6  32.5  52.6  13.0 13.8  13.0 
1969-70  23.4 12.8  1.8  30.6 39.8  150.6 88.6  85.8  21.3  47.0  14.2 14.2  14.2 
1970-71  16.2 15.6 -0.6 19.2 46.1 119.3 92.2 60.2 37.1 46.5  17.5 17.0  17.5 
1970-71   28.0 20.0  0.0  23.0  100.0  29.0 92.2  60.2  44.0  >250      
a The TOTAL agric weighted average uses weights based on the unassisted value of production (actual 
back to 1966, and the average for 1966-69 for earlier years), from Anderson, Lattimore, Lloyd and 
MacLaren (2007). For the products covered by the Commission but not by Lloyd, ‘guesstimates’ have 
been made for the years before 1970, based on the policy descriptions in Edwards (2006) and the 
references cited therein. The only guesstimate of significant size is for wine grapes, whose NRA is 
assumed to equal that estimated by Lloyd for dried vine fruit up to 1970. All others had either no 
assistance (maize, oats, rapeseed, soybean, bananas, olives, wool, beef, sheepmeat, pigmeat, chicken 
meat) or a very small weight in the total gross value of farm production (for the 1950s and 1960s: 
apples 6 percent, oranges 25 percent and potatoes 8 percent; and zero NRA for all three pre-1950-51). 
The final column assumes all products not shown had an NRA of zero, and it includes non-product-
specific assistance which is assumed to have been 1.8 percent of the gross value of farm production in 
1969, 2 percent in 1960, 0.5 percent in 1946, and linear interpolations between those years. 
b  The final column shows the relative rate of assistance as defined on page 8 of the text 
Sources: Lloyd (1973, Table 10.4) except last row which is provided, for comparative purposes, from 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 6: Nominal rates of assistance,
a all agricultural products, New Zealand, 
annual, 1955 to 2005 
(percent) 























1955-64  0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2  24.0 2.1  -16.7 
1965-69  0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2  24.0 2.2  -23.9 
1970  0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.0  -1.0  24.0 5.1  -21.6 
1971  0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.0  -1.0  24.0 5.1 -22.2 
1972  0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.0  -1.0  24.0 5.1 -21.9 
1973  0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.0  -1.0  24.0 5.5 -14.3 
1974  0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.0  -1.0  24.0 5.5 -14.2 
1975  0.0  4.0  0.0  0.0 16.9 11.0 40.0 24.0 20.0 -2.9 
1976  0.0  4.0  0.0  0.0 16.9 11.0 10.0 24.0 13.7 -7.2 
1977  0.0  4.0  0.0  0.0 16.9 11.0 10.0 24.0 13.7 -6.7 
1978  0.0  4.0  0.0  0.0 16.9 11.0 10.0 24.0 13.7 -6.9 
1979  -15.0  4.0  0.0  0.0 16.9 11.0 10.0 52.0 12.8 -4.8 
1980  -15.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 6.8  10.0  32.0  36.0  11.7 -5.5 
1981  -2.0  4.0  0.0  0.0 12.0 10.0 10.0 35.0 10.3 -6.4 
1982  7.0  4.0  0.0  0.0 22.2 26.0 17.0 42.0 18.8 -1.3 
1983  -7.0  4.0  0.0  0.0 35.8 30.0 18.0 24.0 23.0 0.5 
1984  0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0  35.2  19.0  13.0 1.0  18.4 -3.3 
1985  0.0  4.0  0.0  0.0 30.2 10.0 11.0 14.0 15.4 -5.5 
1986  11.0  4.0  0.0  0.0 31.6 14.0 16.0 34.3 18.0 -1.6 
1987  5.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 10.9 11.0 14.0 44.2 10.8 -4.3 
1988  3.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 9.8  11.0  12.0  35.4 9.7 -3.2 
1989  3.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 5.0 5.0  32.9 5.1 -6.3 
1990  2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0  24.5 3.3 -8.0 
1991  1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  26.1 1.7 -8.9 
1992  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  19.7 1.5 -8.6 
1993  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  16.7 1.4 -8.1 
1994  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  22.0 1.5 -6.8 
1995  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  29.6 1.8 -6.2 
1996  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  18.1 1.8 -5.2 
1997  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  22.5 2.1 -4.5 
1998  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  15.1 1.7 -3.4 
1999  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  19.3 1.9 -2.6 
2000  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 5.7 1.0 -2.9 
2001  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 7.3 1.2 -2.5 
2002  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  17.2 1.9 -1.7 
2003  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  21.8 2.2 -1.4 
2004  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  29.9 2.7 -0.9 
2005  2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0  24.6 2.4 -1.1 
a The TOTAL agric weighted average uses weights based on the unassisted value of 
production (actual back to 1966, and the average for 1966-69 for earlier years)  
b The final column shows the relative rate of assistance as defined on page 8 of the text 




Appendix Table 7: Consumer tax equivalent for agricultural products,
a Australia, 1946-
47 to 1970-71 
(percent) 
 








                     
1946-47  -4  -75  na  na 2  na  4  -23  -13  22  na 
1947-48  -20  -66  -72  -9 -19  na  2  -27  -20  30  na 
1948-49  -19  -53  -44  44 -18  na  -8  -22  -17  27  na 
1949-50  -9  -59  -50  9 -17  na  -8  -29  -24  31  na 
1950-51  -27  -53  -53  -1 -25  na  3  -33  -28  5  na 
1951-52  -18  -42  -41  10 -8  na  28  -23  -2  11  6 
1952-53  -3  -23  -5  1 7  na  14  3  20  20  24 
1953-54  13  0  19  26 24  -3  16  0  17  34  58 
1954-55  29  12  1  11 26  -14  46  4  28  29  80 
1955-56  19  4  21  -3 22  -16  51  24  2  15  48 
1956-57  20  4  14  12 30  -36  42  51  61  15  46 
1957-58  24  2  -1  18 18  -19  65  89  97  20  46 
1958-59  51  9  10  19 39  -33  65  40  2  19  58 
1959-60  47  12  27  9 40  2  54  36  37  41  56 
1960-61  39  13  38  17 57  -21  75  83  34  46  29 
1961-62  30  10  10  5 66  -48  54  65  50  57  64 
1962-63  35  17  14  19 53  -19  72  46  40  40  57 
1963-64  49  1  7  17 -7  17  62  41  35  36  44 
1964-65  46  9  4  13 44  28  111  44  33  42  40 
1965-66  44  8  4  17 81  40  159  58  38  51  62 
1966-67  31  7  7  18 111  43  115  62  49  54  46 
1967-68  38  21  18  7 141  30  159  101  118  51  48 
1968-69  49  34  22  5 128  40  231  120  134  72  55 
1969-70  53  22  24  16 74  28  189  109  105  84  47 
1970-71  86  26  -7  17 58  38  147  87  75  96  47 
a Oilseeds include only linseed oil 




Appendix Table 8: Consumer tax equivalent for agricultural products, Australia and New 




















Eggs  ALL, 
wted. 
ave. 
           
1986  16  10 0  0  0 12  54 0  1  0  0 26  12
1987  15  0 0 0 0  12  54  0 1 0 0 9  9
1988  3 0 0 0 0 8  13  0 2 0 0 8  3
1989  3 1 0 0 0 6  52  0 2 0 0 8  10
1990  5 3 0 0 0 9  66  0 3 0 0 8  14
1991  2 1 0 0 0 7  26  0 0 0 0 7  5
1992  2 1 0 0 0 5  10  0 0 0 0 2  2
1993  1 1 0 0 0 4  49  0 0 0 0 3  10
1994  2 1 0 0 0 4  40  0 0 0 0 4  7
1995  2 1 0 0 0 4  16  0 0 0 0 2  3
1996  3 1 0 0 0 4  18  0 0 0 0 0  4
1997  2 1 0 0 0 0  19  0 0 0 0 0  4
1998  2 1 0 0 0 0  19  0 0 0 0 0  4
1999  2 0 0 0 0 0  20  0 0 0 0 0  3
2000  2 0 0 0 0 0  14  0 0 0 0 0  2
2001  2 0 0 0 0 0  12  0 0 0 0 0  2
2002  2 0 0 0 0 0  15  0 0 0 0 0  2
2003  2 0 0 0 0 0  14  0 0 0 0 0  2
2004  2 0 0 0 0 0  12  0 0 0 0 0  2





Appendix Table 8 (continued): Consumer tax equivalent for agricultural products, 
Australia and New Zealand, 1986 to 2005 
(percent) 
 














Poultry  Eggs  ALL, 
wted. 
ave. 
         
1986  0 0 0 0  17  0 0 4  32  51  11 
1987  0 0 0 0 5  0 0 1  78  37  10 
1988  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  57  45  7 
1989  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  45  48  6 
1990  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  57  28  6 
1991  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  57  31  7 
1992  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  48  25  5 
1993  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  40  24  5 
1994  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  49  29  6 
1995  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  56  38  7 
1996  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  47  22  6 
1997  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  44  33  5 
1998  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  20  33  4 
1999  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  25  38  4 
2000  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  20  7  2 
2001  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 -6  27  0 
2002  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  40  7  5 
2003  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  56  -4  8 
2004  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  45  35  8 
2005  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  52  35  9 
 
 




Appendix Figure 1: International terms of trade, Australia and New Zealand, 1949-50 to 
2005-06 
 



















































































































































a Ratio of implicit price deflator for goods and services exports relative to imports  
 




Appendix Figure 2: Industry shares of gross value of farm production at assisted prices, 
Australia and New Zealand, 1966 to 2003 



























Residual Cattle + mutton Wheat
Wool Chickenmeat + pork + heggs Dairy



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Figure 4: Commodity composition of agricultural and processed food exports, 














































Appendix Figure 5: Number of farms and of farmers, Australia and New Zealand, 1950-


































No. of Australian farmrs
No. of Australian farmers
No. of NZ farmers
 
 
Source: Compiled from data taken from ABARE and from NZ Treasury (2007) 
 